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I. INTRODUCTION
Ray is a noncitizen who was admitted to the United States five years
ago as a lawful permanent resident (LPR).1 Ray was convicted of
*
Candidate for Juris Doctor, Hamline University School of Law, May 2014. I
would like to thank my Notes and Comments Editors, Patty Devoy, Kacy Wothe, and Rachel
Kohler for their guidance and support throughout the research and writing process; the
Hamline Law Review for providing me with the opportunity to publish this article; Aisha N.
Servaty for her support through this entire process; and to my family and friends for
everything.
1
See infra note 22 (explaining the different treatment of LPRs based on the
amount of time residing in the United States).
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misdemeanor theft at the age of eighteen when he first arrived to the United
States, but turned his life around and works at a fast food restaurant in Saint
Paul, Minnesota. One day, Ray borrowed his friend’s car to drive to work.
Running late, Ray drove over the speed limit and was pulled over by Officer
Jones, who asked him to identify himself. Ray nervously blurted out a
fictitious name while rummaging for the car’s insurance card. Officer Jones
checked this information and discovered that Ray lied to him. Officer Jones
confronted Ray, and Ray told the officer his real name and explained that he
was borrowing a friend’s car, so he did not know whether or not it was
insured. In his report, Officer Jones wrote that Ray lied about his name
because he could not provide proof of insurance. The local prosecutor
charged Ray with driving over the speed limit and two misdemeanors: failing
to provide proof of insurance and providing a false name to a peace officer.2
Ray, appearing pro se, pleaded guilty to all charges and was sentenced to six
months of probation and ordered to pay fines.
Not long after, Ray received a Notice to Appear in Immigration
3
Court. Immigration officials alleged that Ray should be deported because
his conviction for providing a false name to a peace officer constituted a
“crime involving moral turpitude” (CIMT).4 Ray argued that he should not
2

See infra note 60 (providing the relevant text of MINN. STAT. § 609.506
(2012)). The “providing a false name to a peace officer” statute is divisible into one
misdemeanor and two gross misdemeanor offenses. See MINN. STAT. § 609.506. Bobadilla
was convicted of the misdemeanor offense. See infra text accompanying note 60 (describing
Bobadilla’s conviction). See also MINN. STAT. § 169.791, subd. 2 (2012) (stating that failure
to provide proof of automobile insurance upon a peace officer’s request is a misdemeanor).
However, MINN. STAT. § 169.791, subd. 2 would not constitute a CIMT because a conviction
under this statute does not necessarily involve inherently base, vile, and reprehensible
conduct. See infra text accompanying note 78 (describing the Eighth Circuit’s definition of
morally turpitudinous conduct).
3
The Notice to Appear is a written notice to the alien that includes the following
information:
the nature of the proceedings; the legal authority under which the
proceedings are conducted; the acts or conduct alleged to be in violation
of the law; the charge(s) against the alien and the statutory provision(s)
alleged to have been violated; the opportunity to be represented by
counsel at no expense to the government; the consequences of failing to
appear at scheduled hearings; [and] the requirement that the alien
immediately provide the Attorney General with a written record of an
address and telephone number.
Dep’t of Justice, Immigration Court Practice Manual 4.2 (2008) (describing a notice to
appear).
4
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 846 (8th ed. 2005) (defining moral turpitude as
“[c]onduct that is contrary to justice, honesty, or morality”); see also 9 Foreign Affairs
Manual (FAM) 40.21(a) N2.2 (2012) (noting that CIMTs most often involve elements of
fraud, larceny, and intent to harm persons or things); see also Ann Benson & Jonathan Moore,
Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude: What Advocates Need To Know To Represent SelfPetitioners & U Visa Applicants, WASHINGTON DEFENDER ASSOCIATION’S IMMIGRATION
PROJECT (December 2009), https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source
=web&cd=2&ved=0CDcQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.asistahelp.org%2Fdocuments%
2Ffilelibrary%2Fdocuments%2FASISTA_crimes_webinar_december_09_A8F0BB24E501F.
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be deported because providing a false name to a peace officer was not a
CIMT.5 Who is correct?
According to the Eighth Circuit’s recent decision in Bobadilla v.
Holder, it depends.6 In Bobadilla, the Eighth Circuit adopted the SilvaTrevino framework, a three-step process for analyzing whether a criminal
conviction constitutes a CIMT. 7 The Eighth Circuit held that, although
providing a false name to a peace officer was not categorically a CIMT, it
may still be considered a CIMT under the framework’s third step.8 The
Eighth Circuit’s sudden adoption of the Silva-Trevino framework surprised
many observers, especially after the court appeared to reject the framework
in a similar 2010 decision.9
This article explores the impact of the Bobadilla decision for
practicing criminal and immigration attorneys. The Bobadilla court’s
approval of the Silva-Trevino framework has serious implications on the
determination of CIMTs in the Eighth Circuit. The most important change
requires adjudicators to look beyond the record of conviction when the
record of conviction is inconclusive.10 This additional step necessitates that
ppt&ei=f7pQUeG5N6qqyAHop4DoBg&usg=AFQjCNFjAf3PZ4pE6CTFCse3pR9xWyLsIw
&bvm=bv.44158598,d.aWc [hereinafter Benson & Moore, Crimes Involving Moral
Turpitude] (discussing and providing examples of traditional CIMTs, including: (1) offenses
with elements involving theft with intent to permanently deprive, fraud and deceit; (2)
offenses of morally offensive character committed with willful/evil intent; (3) crimes that
have as an element intent to cause or threaten to cause significant bodily harm (usually
requiring willful or intentional conduct, but also recklessness in some cases ); or (4) drug
trafficking offenses).
5
See infra text accompanying notes 60–65 (providing the facts and background
of Bobadilla v. Holder, 679 F.3d 1052 (8th Cir. 2012)).
6
See infra Part III (providing the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning and holding in
Bobadilla).
7
See infra Part II.B (describing the Silva-Trevino framework and its alteration of
the traditional CIMT analysis in several important ways). The categorical approach has two
steps. The traditional categorical approach employs one of three tests to determine whether the
elements of the criminal statute inherently constitute a CIMT. See infra Part II.A.1 (describing
the traditional categorical approach). If it is unclear whether the elements of the statute
constitute a CIMT, then the adjudicator applies the modified categorical approach. The
modified categorical approach allows, at minimum, for the adjudicator to look to the record of
conviction to determine which subdivision of the statute the alien was convicted under. A
broader modified categorical approach permits the adjudicator to look at all documents in the
record of conviction to complete the CIMT analysis. See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing the
modified categorical approach).
8
See infra text accompanying notes 52–54 (describing the Silva-Trevino
framework).
9
See infra text accompanying note 70 (noting the Eighth Circuit’s reversal of its
prior decision in Guardado-Garcia v. Holder, 615 F.3d 900, 902 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. denied,
131 S. Ct. 2445 (2011)).
10
See infra Part IV.A (explaining what “looking beyond the record of
conviction” might entail for immigration attorneys and adjudicators). Extra-record documents
may include police reports, prosecutorial remarks, and probation or pre-sentence reports. See
infra note 54 (providing other potential examples of extra-record documents an adjudicator
may be able to consider under step three of the Silva-Trevino framework).
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immigration attorneys be aware of all pertinent documents related to their
client’s conviction.11 Finally, these changes highlight the need for criminal
defense attorneys to be aware of the possible consequences LPR clients may
face when they plead guilty to certain crimes.12 Accordingly, an
understanding of how adjudicators analyze CIMTs is necessary in order to
provide context for the Bobadilla decision.13
II. BACKGROUND OF CRIMES INVOLVING MORAL
TURPITUDE
The United States Congress established the legal term “crimes
involving moral turpitude” in immigration law over one hundred years ago.14
Congress did so to prevent immigrants convicted of CIMTs from entering the
United States.15 Recently, federal courts have held that if an alien is
convicted of a crime constituting a CIMT, the alien can either be removed
from, or simply denied legal access to, the United States.16 However,
Congress failed to define what constitutes a CIMT, and the United States
Supreme Court has characterized the term as “indefinable.”17 According to
11
See infra Part IV.A (exploring the effect Bobadilla’s application of the SilvaTrevino framework has on CIMT cases in the Eighth Circuit).
12
See infra Part IV.B (discussing the need for defense attorneys counseling LPRs
to be aware of potential immigration consequences).
13
See infra Part II.A (explaining the history of CIMTs and noting that courts
have used various forms of the categorical approach to determine whether a criminal
conviction constitutes a CIMT).
14
See Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182,
1227 (2012) (excluding “. . . persons who have been convicted of a felony or other infamous
crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude . . .”).
15
See In re Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 689 n.1 (A.G. 2008)
(demonstrating that the Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551 was the seminal statute that created
CIMTs). The act did not cover persons convicted of political offenses, “notwithstanding said
political offense may be designated as a ‘felony, crime, infamous crime, or misdemeanor,
involving moral turpitude’ by the law of the land whence he came or by the court convicting.”
Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 551. For a discussion regarding the history of exclusion and
deportation for crimes, see DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN
AMERICAN HISTORY (2007). It appears the term “CIMT” was a response to joint hearings in
Congress, which recommended implementing immigration laws to “separate the desirable
from the undesirable immigrants, and to permit only those to land on our shores who have
certain physical and moral qualities.” Id. at 115 (quoting Special Comm. on Immigration and
Naturalization, 51st Cong., 2d Sess., Rep. (ii) (1891) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
16
See infra Part II.A (discussing the relevant parts of the INA); see also
Immigration Consequences of Convictions Summary Checklist, NYSDA IMMIGRANT DEFENSE
PROJECT (Dec. 2006), http://nm.fd.org/index_files/ImmigrationConsequencesChecklist.pdf
(providing a brief outline of immigration consequences for CIMTs and various other criminal
convictions, including involuntary and/or permanent removal and a twenty-year prison
sentence for attempting to return after removal).
17
See infra Part II.A (explaining the INA’s failure to define the term “crime
involving moral turpitude”); Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 234–35 (1951) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting) (“[N]o one can really say what is meant by say a crime involving moral
turpitude.”).
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the United States Attorney General, this failure has caused lower courts to
apply the term inconsistently.18 To remedy this inconsistency, the Attorney
General called for a unified, three-step inquiry to determine whether a crime
constitutes a CIMT.19 This framework was developed in the 2008 SilvaTrevino case, and it has been a source of controversy among the federal
circuits. Several have explicitly rejected the framework while the Seventh
and Eighth Circuit have adopted it.20

18
See, e.g., Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 688 (stating that the federal courts
have disagreed in how to approach CIMTs); Bobadilla, 679 F.3d at 1055 (noting that the
federal circuit courts’ application of the categorical approach to CIMTs has been “far from
uniform”); see infra Part II.A (examining the various approaches the federal courts have taken
to define CIMTs).
19
See infra Part II.B (describing the three-step Silva-Trevino framework altering
the traditional and modified categorical approaches and allowing adjudicators to look beyond
the record of conviction if the traditional and modified categorical approaches failed to resolve
the CIMT inquiry).
20
See infra Part II.B (describing the Silva-Trevino framework); see also MataGuerrero v. Holder, 627 F.3d 256, 260–61 (7th Cir. 2010) (analyzing and adopting the SilvaTrevino framework); but see Jean-Louis v. Att’y Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 473–74 (3d Cir. 2009)
(rejecting the Silva-Trevino framework as an impermissible reading of the INA statute). The
Third, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits have argued that the Attorney General’s new
methodology is an impermissible reading of the INA statute, and thus have split from the
Seventh and Eighth Circuits. See Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d 462, 473 (3d Cir. 2009); accord
Prudencio v. Holder, 669 F.3d 472, 483–84 (4th Cir. 2012); Fajardo v. Att’y Gen., 659 F.3d
1303, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011). For example, in Jean-Louis, the Third Circuit refused to defer to
the Attorney General’s new methodology, stating that the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA) and numerous other courts have repeatedly held that the term “convicted” prevents the
immigration courts from inquiring into an alien’s specific conduct or examining extra-record
evidence. Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 473. These circuits refuse to bind themselves to the
Attorney General’s view because, in their view, the INA statute is clear. Id. (stating that “the
ambiguity that the Attorney General perceives in the INA is an ambiguity of his own making,
not grounded in the text of the statute, and certainly not grounded in the BIA’s own rulings or
the jurisprudence of courts of appeals going back for over a century.”). Thus, because
Congress’s intent was clear, Chevron fails, and these courts are not required to follow SilvaTrevino. Id.; see infra note 68 (discussing the Chevron deference test). The Third, Fourth, and
Eleventh Circuits held that an individualized inquiry into an alien’s specific conduct and
consideration of “extra-record” evidence is not permitted. See Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 473–
74; accord Prudencio, 669 F.3d at 483–84; Fajardo, 659 F.3d at 1310. Other circuits have
acknowledged parts of Silva-Trevino, but have not adopted the methodology. See, e.g.,
Mustafaj v. Att’y Gen., 369 Fed. Appx. 163, 167–68 (2d Cir. 2010) (deferring to SilvaTrevino’s definition of CIMT, but applying the traditional categorical and modified
categorical approaches); Kellerman v. Att’y Gen., 592 F.3d 700, 704–05 (6th Cir. 2010)
(citing both Silva-Trevino and Jean-Louis before applying the modified categorical approach);
Marmolejo-Campos v. Att’y Gen., 558 F.3d 903, 907 n.6 (9th Cir. 2009) (acknowledging that
Silva-Trevino permits looking beyond the record of conviction “when applying the modified
categorical approach,” but nevertheless confining its inquiry to the record of conviction).
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A. The Federal Courts Use Various Forms of the Categorical Approach to
Decipher CIMTs
Adjudicators have struggled with deciphering CIMTs since the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) was enacted.21 This statute states that
any alien is deportable if convicted of a CIMT committed within five years
(or ten years in the case of an LPR) after the date of admission to the United
States for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed.22 Without
a firm definition, adjudicators in the Department of Justice (DOJ) and federal
appellate courts have long used varying forms of the categorical approach to
determine whether a crime constitutes a CIMT.23 The categorical approach
analyzes the substantive elements of the criminal conviction, as opposed to
looking at the individual defendant’s acts underlying the conviction, in order
to determine whether a particular conviction constitutes a CIMT.24 The
21

See supra text accompanying note 15 (describing the history of CIMTs).
8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 1227(a)(2)(A)(i-ii). Section 1227, in relevant
part, provides the following:
(i) Any alien who—
(I) is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed
within five years (or 10 years in the case of an alien provided
lawful permanent resident status . . .) after the date of admission,
and
(II) is convicted of a crime for which a sentence of one year or
longer may be imposed, is deportable.
(ii) Any alien who at any time after admission is convicted of 2 or more
crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of
criminal misconduct, regardless of whether confined therefor and
regardless of whether the convictions were in a single trial, is deportable.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i-ii).
Section 1182 provides, in relevant part, that “any alien convicted of, or who admits
having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of
(I) a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or an attempt or
conspiracy to commit such a crime . . . is inadmissible.” § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). “‘Removable’
means, in the case of an alien not admitted to the United States, that the alien is inadmissible
under [8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)], or, in the case of an alien admitted to the United States, that the
alien is deportable under [8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)].” AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR. & STEVEN C. BELL,
IMMIGRATION FUNDAMENTALS: A GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE § 7:5 (4th ed. 2011). An alien
who has been in the United States for less than five years and has not petitioned for LPR
status is considered a “non-immigrant” or “parolee.” § 8 U.S.C. 1255. The alien does not
actually have to be sentenced to one year in order for the crime to be considered a CIMT;
rather, the statute specifies that the crime must simply be one for which a sentence of one year
or longer may be imposed. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)–(ii).
23
Franklin v. I.N.S., 72 F.3d 571, 572 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing Cabral v. I.N.S., 15
F.3d 193, 195 (1st Cir. 1994)) (stating that whether a crime is one for moral turpitude is a
question of federal law). Immigration judges and the BIA typically apply the law of the circuit
in which it sits; therefore, immigration courts vary in CIMT analysis as much as the circuit
courts. See Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 688. See also infra text accompanying notes 26–
40 (describing the various approaches circuit courts have used in determining CIMTs).
24
United States ex rel. Mylius, 210 F. 860, 862 (2d Cir. 1914) (describing the
categorical nature of CIMT inquiry and using a categorical approach in 1914); but see Ali v.
Mukasey, 521 F.3d 737, 743 (7th Cir. 2008); Mata-Guerrero, 627 F.3d at 260 (allowing
22
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categorical approach involves a two-step process: the “traditional categorical
approach” and the “modified categorical approach.”25
1. Step One: The Traditional Categorical Approach
The traditional categorical approach considers the elements of
conviction and whether the offenses defined under a criminal statute
“necessarily” involve moral turpitude.26 Three different tests applying the
traditional categorical approach arose out of the circuit courts: the “minimum
conduct” test, the “realistic probability” test, and the “common case” test.27
These tests analyze criminal statutes of convictions differently. The
minimum conduct test states that a conviction will be a CIMT only if moral
turpitude is part of even the most minimal conduct that could hypothetically
permit a conviction.28 Conversely, the realistic probability test considers
adjudicators to look at evidence outside of the record of conviction in order to determine
whether the alien’s conviction constitutes a CIMT). The substantive elements of the criminal
statute are the elements that define the crime; the conduct that constitutes the crime, and
defenses, which specify under what circumstances that conduct is not a crime. 1 WILLIAM R.
LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 1.6 (2d ed. 2013).
25
See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 601–02 (1990) (providing an outline
of the traditional categorical approach). The Taylor outline has been adopted by courts in the
immigration context, including the analysis of whether a conviction constitutes a CIMT as
used in the statute. See Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 478 (noting several cases where the Taylor
approach was employed to determine the existence of a CIMT). The “modified categorical
approach” is only used if the traditional categorical approach fails to resolve the ambiguity of
whether moral turpitude necessarily inheres to the criminal statute. See Bobadilla, 679 F.3d at
1055 (describing the modified categorical approach). A criminal statute could be ambiguous
if, for example, it is divisible into several subsections and some convictions under the statute
involve moral turpitude while others do not. See Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 466 (“where a statute
of conviction contains disjunctive elements, some of which are sufficient for conviction of the
. . . offense and others of which are not, we have departed from a strict categorical
approach.”); Amouzadeh v. Winfrey, 467 F.3d 451, 455 (5th Cir. 2006) (“If the statute is
divisible, ‘we look at the alien’s record of conviction to determine whether he has been
convicted of a subsection that qualifies as a [CIMT].’” (quoting Smalley v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d
332, 336 (5th Cir. 2003))).
26
Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601–02 (describing the traditional categorical approach).
Taylor involved the sentencing enhancement for felonies. However, the Supreme Court
imported the categorical approach into the immigration context to determine whether a
conviction was a theft offense and therefore an aggravated felony. Gonzales v. DuenasAlvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 185–87 (2007). The categorical approach has also been adopted by
various courts for crimes of violence and CIMTs in the immigration arena. See supra note 25
and accompanying text (discussing the Taylor outline); see, e.g., United States v. Diaz-Ibarra,
522 F.3d 343, 348 (4th Cir. 2008) (using the categorical approach to determine if conviction is
for a crime of violence); Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2007)
(using the Taylor framework to determine if conviction involved moral turpitude).
27
Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 696 (analyzing the three traditional
categorical approach tests and adopting the realistic probability test).
28
Id. The Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits have adopted the minimum conduct
test. See, e.g., Mendez v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 345, 348 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Under the categorical
approach, we look only to the minimum criminal conduct necessary to satisfy the essential
elements of the crime, not the particular circumstances of the defendant's conduct”);
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whether moral turpitude would inhere in acts that would realistically be
prosecuted under the statute in question.29 Alternatively, the common case
test determines whether moral turpitude is inherent in the “usual” case or in
the “general nature” of the crime.30 Regardless of the test used, if the
traditional categorical approach failed to resolve the inquiry, adjudicators
would move to the modified categorical approach.
2. Step Two: The Modified Categorical Approach
The “modified categorical approach” is used only if the traditional
categorical approach does not clarify whether the criminal statute at issue
involves moral turpitude.31 The type of test used under the traditional
categorical approach step affects the way adjudicators reach the modified

Amouzadeh, 467 F.3d at 455 (“Under the categorical approach, we read the statute at its
minimum, taking into account ‘the minimum criminal conduct necessary to sustain a
conviction under the statute.’ An offense is a crime involving moral turpitude if the minimum
reading of the statute necessarily reaches only offenses involving moral turpitude.” (quoting
Hamdan v. I.N.S., 98 F.3d 183, 189 (5th Cir. 1996))); Partyka v. Att’y Gen., 417 F.3d 408,
411 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Under this categorical approach, we read the applicable statute to
ascertain the least culpable conduct necessary to sustain a conviction under the statute.”). The
Eleventh Circuit has conflicting precedent, but appears to have also adopted this approach. See
Keungne v. Att’y Gen., 561 F.3d 1281, 1284 n.3 (11th Cir. 2009) (“In the [first step of the]
categorical approach, we analyze whether the least culpable conduct necessary to sustain a
conviction under the statute meets the standard of a crime involving moral turpitude”). For an
example of the application of the minimum conduct test, see Martinez v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d
113, 122 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that “[u]nder the categorical approach, a showing that the
minimum conduct for which [the alien] was convicted was not an aggravated felony suffices”
to show that he “has not been convicted of an aggravated felony”).
29
Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 696. By 2008, the Ninth Circuit adopted the
realistic probability test, which asks whether moral turpitude necessarily inheres in all cases
that have a realistic probability of being prosecuted. See, e.g., Nicanor-Romero v. Mukasey,
523 F.3d 992, 1004–05 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying the realistic probability test to a CIMT
analysis of a California criminal statute). The Attorney General stated:
A realistic probability exists where, at the time of the
proceeding, an “actual (as opposed to hypothetical) case exists in which
the relevant criminal statute was applied to conduct that did not involve
moral turpitude. If the statute has not been so applied in any case
(including the alien's own case), the adjudicator can reasonably conclude
that all convictions under the statute may categorically be treated as ones
involving moral turpitude.”
Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 697, 708 (citing Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 193).
30
Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 696. Prior to 2008, the First and Eighth
Circuits adopted the common case test. See, e.g., Marciano v. I.N.S., 450 F.2d 1022 (8th Cir.
1971) (using the crime’s general nature and its common usage classification in determining
whether moral turpitude is inherent); Pino v. Nicholls, 215 F.2d 237, 245 (1st Cir. 1954),
rev’d on other grounds, Pino v. Landon, 349 U.S. 901 (1955).
31
Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 690 (discussing the modified categorical
approach). The modified categorical approach applies when the criminal statute could apply to
crimes that both do and do not involve moral turpitude. Id.
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categorical approach step.32 Under this approach, adjudicators consult the
alien’s record of conviction to determine which portion of the statute his
conviction fell under in order to establish whether convictions under that
portion necessarily involve moral turpitude.33 The record of conviction
generally consists of some or all of the following: (1) the charging document,
(2) a written plea agreement, (3) a verdict or judgment of conviction, (4) a
record of the sentence, (5) a plea colloquy transcript, and (6) any factual
finding by a trial judge or the jury.34 Adjudicators are not permitted to
32
Id. at 694. Some courts, especially those that use the least culpable conduct test
for the first step, have referred to this second step as “an exception to [the categorical
approach] . . . if the statute is divisible into discrete subsections of acts that are and those that
are not CIMTs.” Hamdan, 98 F.3d at 187. See also Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 466 (“where a
statute of conviction contains disjunctive elements, some of which are sufficient for
conviction of the . . . offense and others of which are not, we have departed from a strict
categorical approach.”); Amouzadeh, 467 F.3d at 455 (“If the statute is divisible, ‘we look at
the alien’s record of conviction to determine whether he has been convicted of a subsection
that qualifies as a [CIMT].’” (quoting Smalley, 354 F.3d at 336)). The courts that use the
realistic probability test, on the other hand, tend to treat the modified categorical approach like
a second step in the CIMT inquiry, and it is used primarily when the traditional categorical
approach is inconclusive. See Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N Dec. at 708 (treating the modified
categorical approach as a second step in the CIMT inquiry). The modified categorical
approach is used when crimes that both do and do not involve moral turpitude can be
prosecuted under the criminal statute due to broad language in the statutes. Id. at 694. In
addition, adjudicators using the realistic probability test will also use the modified categorical
approach when a statute is divisible. See infra text accompanying notes 33, 63 (defining the
term “divisible statute”).
33
See, e.g., Kellermann, 592 F.3d at 703. The court states:
We must first examine the statute itself to determine whether the
inherent nature of the crime involves moral turpitude. If the statute defines
a crime in which moral turpitude necessarily inheres, then the conviction
is for a CIMT . . . and our analysis ends. However, if the statute contains
some offenses which involve moral turpitude and others which do not, it is
. . . a ‘divisible’ statute, and we look to the record of conviction . . . .
Id. (quoting In re Ajami, 22 I. & N. Dec. 949, 950 (B.I.A. 1999)). A divisible statute is a
statute that has several sections or uses disjunctive language to define multiple offenses. See
United States v. Beardsley, 691 F.3d 252, 269–270 (2d Cir. 2012). Each of the sections or the
language of the statute can be separated and made into stand-alone statutes with its own
distinct elements. See In re T-, 2 I. & N. Dec. 22, 23 (B.I.A. 1944) (“If one statute defines
several crimes, some of which involve moral turpitude and some of which do not, and the
statute is divisible, it is permissible to ascertain by examination of the record of conviction
whether the particular offense involved moral turpitude.”). A statute need not be formally
divided into subsections; “rather, the key is whether the provision is disjunctive in a relevant
sense,” meaning that a statute can be broad enough to involve conduct that both does and does
not involve moral turpitude. Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 462 F.3d 287, 293 n.9 (3d Cir. 2006).
Garcia involved aggravated felonies. Garcia, 462 F.3d at 289. However, Jean-Louis affirmed
the Garcia approach as applicable in CIMT inquiries. See Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 466
(applying the modified categorical approach from Garcia “when clear sectional divisions do
not delineate the statutory variations”).
34
Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005) (allowing the use of the
“charging document,” “the terms of a plea agreement,” “transcript of colloquy between judge
and defendant,” or “some comparable judicial record” regarding “factual basis for the plea” in
nonjury cases); Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602 (allowing the use of “the indictment or information
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consider any facts underlying the alien’s conviction that are outside the
record of conviction.35 The adjudicator looks to the record of conviction to
determine if the elements, as revealed in the record of conviction, fall within
the CIMT definition.36 However, if the record of conviction remains
ambiguous, then the categorical inquiry ends because the adjudicator is
unable to conclude that the alien was convicted of a CIMT.37 Under those
circumstances, the alien’s conviction would not be considered a CIMT and
the alien would not be subject to removal.38
There are two versions of the modified categorical approach. The
majority of circuits use the record of conviction narrowly to determine under
what portion of the statute the alien was convicted.39 The minority, used by
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and the First and Seventh Circuits,
permits broader use of the record of conviction because the elements of a
CIMT may not be the same as those for conviction under the criminal
statute.40 In light of these different interpretations, former Attorney General
Mukasey developed a new framework for analyzing CIMTs.41
and jury instructions”); see also Wala v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 102, 108 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The
record of conviction includes, inter alia, ‘the charging document, a plea agreement, a verdict
or judgment of conviction, a record of the sentence, or a plea colloquy transcript.’” (quoting
Dickson v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 44, 53 (2d Cir. 2003))).
35
See In re Sweetser, 22 I. & N. Dec. 709, 714 (B.I.A. 1999) (“Where a statute
under which an alien was convicted is divisible, we look to the record of conviction . . . . This
approach does not involve an inquiry into facts previously presented and tried. Instead the
focus is on the elements required to sustain the conviction.”). Sweetser was also an aggravated
felony case. Id. at 710. However, the statement that the modified categorical approach is
limited to the record of conviction remains the same for cases involving CIMTs. See JeanLouis, 582 F.3d at 472 (“We review[] only the record of the conviction to ascertain the
particular variation of the statute under which the defendant was convicted.”).
36
See, e.g., Kellerman, 592 F.3d at 704 (stating that under the modified
categorical approach, “the court conducts a limited examination of documents in the record to
determine whether the particular offense for which the alien was convicted constitute a
CIMT”). See 9 FAM 40.21(a) N2.2 (“A conviction for a statutory offense will involve moral
turpitude if one or more of the elements of that offense have been determined to involve moral
turpitude. The most common elements involving moral turpitude are: (1) Fraud; (2) Larceny;
and (3) Intent to harm persons or things.”).
37
See Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. at 688–89; see also Benson & Moore, Crimes
Involving Moral Turpitude (“Under [the] traditional “modified” categorical analysis, if [the
record of conviction] does not clearly establish elements of conviction that fall [within the]
CIMT definition then CIMT grounds [are] not triggered and analysis ends.”).
38
Benson & Moore, Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude (noting that the removal
analysis ends if the record of conviction does not clearly establish that the elements of
conviction fall within the CIMT definition).
39
See, e.g., Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 1159, 1160 (9th Cir. 2006)
(stating that the record of conviction should be used if the alien “‘pled guilty to elements that
constitute a [CIMT]’” (quoting Cuevas-Gaspar v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1013, 1020 (9th Cir.
2005))); Vargas v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 451 F.3d 1105, 1109 (10th Cir. 2006) (explaining
that the Taylor modified categorical approach is an inquiry into whether the jury had to find
elements of the underlying offense that would constitute CIMT).
40
See In re Grazley, 14 I. & N. Dec. 330 (B.I.A. 1973) (using the record of
conviction to assess the underlying conduct even though it was not a necessary element in the
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B. The Attorney General Establishes a New Framework to Analyze CIMTs
in Silva-Trevino
Former Attorney General Mukasey viewed Silva-Trevino as an
opportunity to unify the federal circuit courts’ approaches to determining
CIMTs.42 While the DOJ generally defers to the relevant circuit court when
deciding which approach to use in a given case, the DOJ is responsible for
providing a method for interpreting and applying ambiguous immigration
law provisions.43 The Attorney General sought to resolve a major issue
concerning what courts should consider if the traditional categorical analysis
failed to resolve the CIMT inquiry.44 Some courts prohibited immigration
judges from inquiring into specific facts of cases.45 Others courts looked to
the record of conviction for the alien’s prior offense—but not beyond that
record—in all cases where the criminal statute at issue “prohibit[ed] conduct
criminal conviction). See Ali, 521 F.3d at 743 (holding that the BIA could use evidence
outside of the record of conviction to determine a crime’s moral turpitude).
41
Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 693–96 (discussing the Attorney General’s
reasoning for establishing the Silva-Trevino framework for CIMT analysis).
42
The Attorney General is authorized to review BIA cases in three
circumstances: (1) when the Attorney General directs the BIA to refer a case to him; (2) when
the Chairman or a majority of the BIA decides to refer a case; or (3) when the Secretary of
Homeland Security or designated officials request referral to the Attorney General. 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.1(h)(1) (2013) (discussing referral of cases to Attorney General). The Attorney
General’s decisions are considered binding authority within the Department of Homeland
Security. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (2013); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (2012)
(“[D]etermination and ruling by the Attorney General with respect to all questions of law shall
be controlling.”).
43
Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 695. See also INA § 103(a)(1) (stating that a
“determination and ruling by the Attorney General with respect to all questions of law shall be
controlling”); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1) (2013) (“[T]he Board through precedent decisions, shall
provide clear and uniform guidance to [the Department of Homeland Security], the
immigration judges, and the general public on the proper interpretation and administration of
the Act.”); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (2013) (“Except as Board decisions may be modified or
overruled by the Board or the Attorney General, decisions of the Board, and decisions of the
Attorney General, shall be binding on all officers and employees of the Department of
Homeland Security or immigration judges in the administration of the immigration laws of the
United States.”); I.N.S. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999) (“[W]e have recognized
that judicial deference to the Executive Branch is especially appropriate in the immigration
context where officials ‘exercise especially sensitive political functions that implicate
questions of foreign relations.’” (quoting I.N.S. v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988))); Shao v.
B.I.A., 465 F.3d 497, 502 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that “only a precedential decision by the
[Board]—or the Supreme Court of the United States—can ensure the uniformity that seems to
us especially desirable in [asylum] cases such as these”).
44
Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 694 (exploring the various ways federal
courts view the use of the record of conviction in CIMT analyses).
45
Id. (citing Rodriguez-Castro v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 316, 320–21 (5th Cir.
2005)) (“In our de novo interpretation and evaluation of a state law, we look to the statutory
crime definition as interpreted by the state's courts, without regard to the particular
circumstances surrounding the specific offender's violation”).
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that may not necessarily involve moral turpitude.”46 Still other courts
considered the record of conviction only if the statute of conviction was
divisible into multiple sections.47 Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit allowed
the BIA to consider all relevant evidence bearing on the particular facts of an
alien’s prior criminal conviction.48 These differences, according to the
Attorney General, were problematic because of the impact differing laws had
on individuals’ fundamental right to fairness.49
The Attorney General rejected both the minimum conduct and
common case tests.50 Instead, the DOJ adopted the realistic probability test as

46

Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 694 (citing Nicanor-Romero, 523 F.3d at
1007) (limiting review to record of conviction).
47
Id. (citing Amouzadeh, 467 F.3d at 455) (“If the statute is divisible, ‘we look at
the alien’s record of conviction to determine whether he has been convicted of a subsection
that qualifies as a [CIMT].’” (quoting Smalley, 354 F.3d at 336)). A divisible statute is a
statute that has multiple sections or uses disjunctive language to define multiple offenses. The
sections or language can be separated and each made into stand-alone statutes with their own
elements. See T-, 2 I. & N. Dec. at 23 (“If one statute defines several crimes, some of which
involve moral turpitude and some of which do not, and the statute is divisible, it is permissible
to ascertain by examination of the record of conviction whether the particular offense involved
moral turpitude.”).
48
Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 694 (citing Ali, 521 F.3d at 742–43)
(permitting consultation of the presentence report, which is not part of the record of
conviction, to classify the noncitizen’s offense as one that involves moral turpitude).
49
Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 694 (citing In re Cerna, 20 I. & N. 399, 408
(B.I.A. 1991)); see also Rosendo-Ramirez v. I.N.S., 32 F.3d 1085, 1091 (7th Cir. 1994)
(“National uniformity in the immigration and naturalization laws is paramount: rarely is the
vision of a unitary nation so pronounced as in the laws that determine who may cross our
national borders and who may become a citizen.”). The Attorney General noted that aliens
committing identical offences may be treated differently based on geographical location under
the existing arrangement. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 694–95 (arguing determinations of
admissibility eligibility and adjustment of status should not be tied to geographical location).
50
Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 694–95. The Attorney General compared both
tests and found that the minimum conduct test was likely to be under-inclusive of CIMTs,
while the common case test would probably be over-inclusive. Id. The Attorney General noted
that the minimum conduct test would be under-inclusive of CIMTs because the test would
require an adjudicator to refrain from applying the INA CIMT provisions to crimes that
actually do involve moral turpitude if the adjudicator hypothesized a situation in which the
statute might be applied to conduct that does not involve moral turpitude. Id. at 695 (citing
Marciano, 450 F.2d at 1028 (Eisele, J., dissenting) (stating, “I cannot believe that Congress
intended for [persons who have committed CIMTs] to be allowed to remain simply because
there might have been no moral turpitude in the commission by other individuals (real or
hypothetical) of crimes described by the wording of the same statute under an identical
indictment”)). Conversely, the common case test would be over-inclusive of CIMTs because
that test allows adjudicators to generalize the criminal statute so that if most convictions under
the statute involved moral turpitude, then the adjudicator would find that an individual alien
had also likely committed a CIMT regardless of the facts underlying the individual alien’s
conviction. Id. (citing Marciano, 450 F.2d at 1028 (Eisele, J., dissenting) (stating that “[t]he
statute says deportation shall follow when the crime committed involves moral turpitude, not
when that crime ‘commonly’ or ‘usually’ does”)). This finding could lead to the unfair
exclusion of aliens whose conviction did not, in fact, constitute a CIMT. Id.
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part of the Silva-Trevino framework.51 Under the Silva-Trevino framework,
to determine whether a conviction is for a CIMT, the court should first look
to the statute of conviction under the categorical inquiry to establish whether
there is a realistic probability that the state or federal criminal statute under
which the alien was convicted would be applicable to conduct not involving
moral turpitude.52 If the traditional categorical approach is not satisfied and
the adjudicator determines that the statute could apply to conduct not
involving moral turpitude, then the modified categorical approach requires
that the immigration judge examine the record of conviction, including
documents such as the indictment, the judgment of conviction, jury
instructions, a signed guilty plea, and the plea transcript, for evidence that the
alien was in fact convicted of a CIMT.53 Finally, if the record of conviction is
inconclusive, the third step of the framework allows an adjudicator to
consider any additional evidence deemed necessary or appropriate to resolve
accurately the moral turpitude question.54 The third step has been the subject
of the majority of the controversy and criticism regarding the decision in
Silva-Trevino.55 Several circuit courts, including the Eighth Circuit,
expressly rejected the Silva-Trevino framework.56
51
Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 696 (adopting the realistic probability test). The
Attorney General stated:
A realistic probability exists where, at the time of the proceeding, an
“actual (as opposed to hypothetical) case exists in which the relevant
criminal statute was applied to conduct that did not involve moral
turpitude. If the statute has not been so applied in any case (including the
alien's own case), the adjudicator can reasonably conclude that all
convictions under the statute may categorically be treated as ones
involving moral turpitude.”
Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 697, 708 (citing Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 193).
52
Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 687. Under the categorical approach, the court
must examine the case law of the statute of conviction and determine if that statute of
conviction requires reprehensible conduct undertaken with some form of intent. MataGuerrero, 627 F.3d at 260 (citing Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 701–03). The case law for
the statute of conviction may illustrate that all convictions under the statute categorically
constitute a CIMT. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 697. The case law for the statute of
conviction may also illustrate that no convictions under the statute categorically constitute a
CIMT. Id. The case law for the statute of conviction may also illustrate that the court cannot
treat all convictions under the statute as categorically similar. Id.
53
Mata-Guerrero, 627 F.3d at 260 (citing Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 699,
701–03). Under this approach, the court examines the record of conviction for indications that
the alien’s conduct constituted a CIMT. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 698. The record of
conviction may show that the conviction was for conduct that reflected “specific intent,
deliberateness, willfulness, or recklessness.” Id. at 697.
54
Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 704. See Benson & Moore, Crimes Involving
Moral Turpitude (providing that prosecutor’s remarks, police reports (unless incorporated into
plea as factual basis), probation or pre-sentence reports, dismissed charges, and defendant’s
statements outside judgment and sentence are not considered part of the record of conviction).
However, these documents may be part of the extra-record evidence that an adjudicator could
consider under Silva-Trevino’s third step.
55
See, e.g., Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 474 (stating that “the CIMT determination
focuses on the crime of which the alien was convicted—not the specific acts that the alien
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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Bobadilla marks a shift in the Eighth Circuit’s analysis of CIMTs. In
Bobadilla, the Eighth Circuit applied the Silva-Trevino framework to
determine whether providing a false name to a peace officer constitutes a
CIMT.57 By applying the Silva-Trevino framework, the Eighth Circuit
abandoned its prior case law, taking into consideration evidence beyond an
alien’s record of conviction to determine whether the alien was convicted of
a CIMT.58
A. Bobadilla v. Holder: Factual Background
Orlando Manuel Godoy Bobadilla, a native and citizen of Canada,
had been a lawful permanent resident in the United States since 1998.59 He
was convicted in Minnesota state court of giving a false name to a peace
officer and theft.60 The Department of Homeland Security commenced
may have committed”); accord Prudencio, 669 F.3d at 483–84 (rejecting the third step of the
Silva-Trevino framework for allowing an immigration judge to “rely on documents of
questionable veracity as ‘proof’ of an alien’s conduct,” including police report and warrant
application, which “often contain little more than unsworn witness statements and initial
impressions” that do not account for later events, such as witness recantations, amendments,
or corrections); Fajardo, 659 F.3d at 1311 (holding that the BIA and the immigration judge
erred by considering evidence beyond the record of the alien’s false imprisonment
conviction).
56
See supra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing the various circuit court
cases rejecting the Silva-Trevino framework); see also Guardado-Garcia, 615 F.3d at 902
(rejecting the Silva-Trevino framework as inconsistent with the Eighth Circuit precedent).
57
See infra text accompanying note 66 (describing the Eighth Circuit’s adoption
of the Silva-Trevino framework).
58
See infra text accompanying note 70 (noting the Eighth Circuit’s reversal of its
2010 decision in Guardado-Garcia).
59
Bobadilla, 679 F.3d at 1052–53 (providing the background information leading
up to the Bobadilla decision).
60
Id. at 1053. MINN. STAT. § 609.506, subd.1 provides, in relevant part:
Whoever with intent to obstruct justice gives a fictitious name
other than a nickname, or gives a false date of birth, or false or
fraudulently altered identification card to a peace officer . . . when that
officer makes inquiries incident to a lawful investigatory stop or lawful
arrest, or inquiries incident to executing any other duty imposed by law, is
guilty of a misdemeanor.
Although immigration judges have considered providing a false name to peace officer, these
decisions have never been reviewed by the BIA or a federal court because, in each case, the
alien failed to raise the argument prior to appealing the immigration judge’s decision or
conceded that the crime did constitute a CIMT. See Pinos-Gonzales v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d
436, 438 (deferring to the BIA’s rejection of the alien’s claim that his petition should be
reviewed de novo); Reyes-Morales v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 937, 944 n.3 (8th Cir. 2006) (stating
that the alien conceded that his conviction under MINN. STAT. § 609.605 was a CIMT).
Bobadilla’s theft conviction is only noteworthy because the INA requires two or more
convictions for crimes involving moral turpitude in order to deport a long-term resident alien.
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deportation proceedings, while Bobadilla denied removability.61 The
immigration judge concluded that both convictions constituted CIMTs and
ordered Bobadilla’s deportation.62 Bobadilla appealed to the BIA, arguing
that the immigration judge failed to apply step two of the Silva-Trevino
analysis, the modified categorical approach, because the conviction was
under a divisible law.63 The BIA affirmed the immigration judge’s ruling,
concluding that because “the statute reflects an intentional attempt to evade
responsibility, the conduct covered by the statute is inherently base, vile, and
reprehensible, and thus, morally turpitudinous.”64 The Eighth Circuit granted
Bobadilla’s petition for review of the BIA’s decision.
B. Procedural Posture and the Reasoning of the Court
The only issue on appeal was whether Bobadilla’s conviction for
providing a false name to a peace officer was categorically a CIMT.65 In
See infra text accompanying note 22 (describing the INA CIMT provisions). Theft has
consistently been found to constitute a CIMT, and therefore Bobadilla’s best chance at
avoiding deportation was to argue that his second conviction was not a CIMT. See DAN
KESSELBRENNER ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND CRIMES ch. 6 (2002) (reviewing and
describing what crimes constitute CIMTs and their potential immigration consequences).
61
Bobadilla, 679 F.3d at 1053 (providing the background of Bobadilla).
Bobadilla denied removability because admitting removability would automatically lead to
deportation. See Reyes-Morales, 435 F.3d at 944 (noting that failing to contest removability is
essentially an admission that the conviction constituted a CIMT).
62
Id. In order for an alien to be deported for a CIMT, he or she must first go
through a removal proceeding to determine whether the crime involves moral turpitude. See
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGR. REV., EOIR AT A GLANCE 1–2 (2010),
available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/2010/EOIRataGlance09092010.htm (describing
removal proceedings in the DOJ). This determination is made by an immigration judge in
administrative courts through the DOJ under the Executive Office for Immigration Review
(EOIR). Id. at 1, 3 (providing organizational information about the EOIR). An immigration
judge’s decision can be appealed to the BIA. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b) (2013) (describing the
appellate jurisdiction of the BIA). The Attorney General may then review cases before the
BIA under limited circumstances. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1) (2013) (describing referral of cases
to Attorney General). Federal courts may also review BIA decisions in limited circumstances.
See INA § 242(b)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4) (2012) (describing the scope and standard for
review by federal circuit courts).
63
Bobadilla, 679 F.3d at 1053. MINN. STAT. § 609.506 has three subdivisions;
subdivisions two and three constitute gross misdemeanors and would be considered CIMTs
because these subdivisions specify fraudulent conduct. MINN. STAT. § 609.506.
64
Bobadilla, 679 F.3d at 1053. While it acknowledged the Silva-Trevino
decision, the BIA did not apply the third step of the Silva-Trevino framework as it concluded
that the statute covered conduct that was inherently morally turpitudinous. Id. (describing the
BIA’s holding in Bobadilla).
65
Id. See supra text accompanying note 60 (explaining that Bobadilla’s best
chance at fighting deportation was to argue that his conviction for providing a false name to a
peace officer did not constitute a CIMT). Although immigration judges have considered
providing a false name to peace officers in at least one prior case, this decision was never
reviewed by the BIA or a federal court because the alien failed to raise the argument prior to
appealing the immigration judge’s decision. See Pinos-Gonzales, 519 F.3d at 438 (deferring to
the BIA’s rejection of the alien’s claim that his petition should be reviewed de novo).
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remanding the decision, the Eighth Circuit adopted the framework laid out
by the United States Attorney General in Silva-Trevino and held that
Bobadilla’s Minnesota conviction for giving a false name to a peace officer
is not categorically a CIMT.66
The INA expressly gives the Attorney General the authority to
decide questions of law that arise under the INA.67 The United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc. is the seminal case addressing the issue of when federal courts must
defer to administrative agencies.68 The deference principles established in
Chevron were used to determine whether Silva-Trevino should be adopted
based on the INA’s expressed grant of power to the Attorney General.69 In
doing so, the Eighth Circuit overruled Guardado-Garcia by accepting the
Silva-Trevino framework as a reasonable interpretation of the INA.70
The Eighth Circuit joined the Seventh Circuit in applying the SilvaTrevino framework to CIMTs.71 Acknowledging the circuit split involving
66

Bobadilla, 679 F.3d at 1053 (adopting the Silva-Trevino framework). The
dissent, written by Judge Gruender, disagreed with the majority’s adoption of the SilvaTrevino framework in this case. Id. at 1059. In his view, the majority mistakenly focused on
Bobadilla’s conduct rather than the nature of the act itself, and thus it was reasonable for the
BIA to maintain, regardless of the Silva-Trevino decision, that “the act of providing false
information to law enforcement with the intent to obstruct justice is categorically an act of
moral turpitude” without having to “look behind Bobadilla’s conviction.” Id. at 1061. He
stated that the BIA’s error was therefore harmless to Bobadilla, and so the majority erred in
addressing the issue of whether the Silva-Trevino framework is a reasonable way of
determining whether a crime involves moral turpitude because it was not essential to the
Court’s decision. Id. at 1061–62.
67
8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (describing the Attorney General’s authority to review
questions of law).
68
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842
(1984) (providing the test for when federal courts ought to defer to administrative agencies
decisions). The first prong of the Chevron deference test asks whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. If Congress’s intent is clear,
then the court and the administrative agency must give deference to it. Id. at 842–43. The
second prong states that even if Congress has yet to speak to the precise question at issue, the
court cannot simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the
absence of an administrative interpretation. Id. at 843. Rather, if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. Id. at 843. The court in Bobadilla
also noted that that “[t]he Supreme Court has repeatedly held that agencies may validly amend
regulations to respond to adverse judicial decisions, or for other reasons, so long as the
amended regulation is a permissible interpretation of the statute.” Bobadilla, 679 F.3d at 1054.
69
Id. See Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 424 (applying Chevron deference
principles to determine whether the agency’s interpretation of a statute was reasonable).
70
Bobadilla, 679 F.3d at 1057 (rejecting Guardado-Garcia as dicta and holding
that it was wrong based on Chevron deference principles). The Guardado-Garcia decision
rejected the Silva-Trevino framework because it was not consistent with Eighth Circuit
precedent, which did not allow adjudicators to look beyond the record of conviction.
Guardado-Garcia, 615 F.3d at 902.
71
Bobadilla, 679 F.3d at 1057 (adopting the Silva-Trevino framework). The
Seventh Circuit deferred to the Silva-Trevino framework because the framework adopts the
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the framework’s adoption, the Eighth Circuit stated that while other circuit
courts refused to apply the Silva-Trevino framework, none of these courts
had carefully analyzed the Attorney General’s reasoning in Silva-Trevino.72
The Eighth Circuit alleged that these courts failed to conclude that the
Attorney General’s new methodology was an unreasonable interpretation of
the INA statute.73 The Eighth Circuit concluded that the Silva-Trevino
methodology was a reasonable interpretation of the statute, and therefore
must be given deference by a reviewing court.74
The court then proceeded to apply the Silva-Trevino framework to
Bobadilla. In addressing the issue of intent, the Eighth Circuit found that the
BIA had failed to conduct an analysis under the realistic probability test
required by the Silva-Trevino framework.75 Determining that the statute’s
requirement of proof of “intent to obstruct justice” was broad and undefined,
the court reasoned that, under these circumstances, the record reflected a
realistic probability that Minnesota would apply the subdivision to conduct
not involving moral turpitude.76 The Eighth Circuit then proceeded to apply
the modified categorical approach to assess Bobadilla’s crime in light of its
conclusion that the Minnesota statute was divisible—embracing some
offenses involving moral turpitude and others not involving moral
turpitude.77 It observed that the “Register of Action” revealed that Bobadilla
Seventh Circuit’s approach to determining CIMTs in Ali. See Ali, 521 F.3d at 743; MataGuerrero, 627 F.3d at 260 (acknowledging and adopting Silva-Trevino).
72
See, e.g., Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 473–74; Prudencio, 669 F.3d at 483–84 (4th
Cir. 2012); Fajardo, 659 F.3d at 1310 (rejecting the Silva-Trevino framework).
73
Bobadilla, 679 F.3d at 1057 (noting that the other circuits had failed to go
beyond the first step of the Chevron deference test, and therefore never examined whether the
Attorney General’s interpretation was reasonable).
74
Id. (analyzing and rejecting the Third Circuit’s rationale for rejecting the SilvaTrevino framework in Jean-Louis). The Eighth Circuit did not clarify why it viewed the SilvaTrevino framework as a reasonable interpretation. Bobadilla, 679 F.3d at 1057 (“We conclude
that the methodology is a reasonable interpretation of the statute and therefore must be given
deference by a reviewing court.”).
75
Bobadilla, 679 F.3d at 1058 (stating that the BIA purported to apply SilvaTrevino, but its decision simply reasoned “that because the statute reflects an intentional
attempt to evade responsibility, the conduct covered by the statute is inherently base, vile, and
reprehensible” without using the realistic probability test).
76
Id. MINN. STAT. § 609.506, Subd. 1, requires proof of “intent to obstruct
justice,” a term the court considered to be broad and undefined. Id. The application notes
following the obstruction-of-justice enhancement in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
include a wide variety of conduct that reflects a broad range of anti-social intentions can
legitimately be called “obstruction of justice.” Id. (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 3C1.1 cmt. 4, 5 (2010)). The court held that there is a real risk of both overinclusiveness and under-inclusiveness under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Bobadilla,
679 F.3d at 1058.
77
Bobadilla, 679 F.3d at 1057. MINN. STAT. § 609.605 has three subdivisions;
subdivisions 2 and 3 constitute gross misdemeanors and would be considered CIMTs because
these subdivisions specify fraudulent conduct. MINN. STAT. § 609.605 (2012). Eighth Circuit
courts appear to be increasingly likely to consider context-based evidence to determine moral
turpitude. See, e.g., Abdi v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 923 F. Supp. 2d 1160,

Published by DigitalCommons@Hamline, 2014

17

Hamline Law Review, Vol. 37 [2014], Iss. 2, Art. 7

444

HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:427

had given a false name in the course of a traffic stop and suggested that, in
this context, many citizens who are not “base, vile or depraved” may be less
than fully truthful or cooperative.78 The Eighth Circuit remanded the case to
the BIA to determine whether Bobadilla’s conviction constituted a CIMT
based on the facts underlying his conviction.79
IV. APPLICATION: PUTTING BOBADILLA INTO PRACTICE
The Bobadilla decision has important implications for immigration
attorneys in the Eighth Circuit. First, adjudicators will now be using the
realistic probability test instead of the common case test when applying the
traditional categorical approach. Second, adjudicators are now encouraged to
take a broad view of the record of conviction when applying the modified
categorical approach. Finally, the most dramatic change allows adjudicators
to look beyond the record of conviction at any evidence the court deems
relevant to determine whether the conviction constitutes a CIMT.
Immigration attorneys must be aware of all of the information related to their
clients’ convictions.
Criminal attorneys should also have a basic understanding of the
process of determining CIMTs because criminal convictions will very likely
impact an alien’s immigration status. Providing a false name to a peace
officer, along with various other crimes under divisible statutes, may be
CIMTs and will be subject to the Silva-Trevino framework.80 Therefore,
criminal defense attorneys should try to plead an alien client’s charge down

1166 (D. Minn. 2013) (discussing the alien’s various convictions prior to the removal process
and noting his conduct did not “comport with that of the average citizen” in his community).
78
Bobadilla, 679 F.3d at 1058. The Eighth Circuit determined that the BIA erred
in failing to consider the “Register of Action” in determining whether Bobadilla’s conviction
qualified as a CIMT. Id. The court cited State v. Costello, which upheld a conviction under the
statute, even though the defendant admitted that he gave a peace officer a false name when he
stopped but claimed that he did not intend to obstruct justice because he immediately gave his
correct name when the officer warned him that giving a false name to a peace officer was a
chargeable offense. Id. (citing State v. Costello, 620 N.W.2d 924 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001)
(noting that the defendant’s testimony that he gave a false name to a peace officer was
sufficient to uphold a conviction under the statute), rev’d on other grounds, 646 N.W.2d 204
(Minn. 2002)).
79
Bobadilla, 679 F.3d at 1059. Dissenting Judge Gruender expressed his concern
that the Court may be inviting the BIA to conduct an inquiry of the specific facts of each
individual’s conduct at step one of the Silva-Trevino methodology or to require the BIA to
always address steps two and three after concluding that a conviction categorically constitutes
a CIMT. Id. at 1061. He noted that the solution to this issue would be for the BIA to use its
case-by-case adjudicatory process to clarify when a conviction requiring deception with intent
to obstruct justice constitutes a CIMT until or unless Minnesota clarified that the statute does
in fact require conduct that categorically involves a CIMT. Id.
80
See supra note 4 and accompanying text (noting that CIMTs most often
involve elements of fraud, larceny, and intent to harm persons or things).
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to a crime that does not involve moral turpitude (e.g., one in which the mens
rea is negligence) and under a statute that is non-divisible.81
A. The Eighth Circuit’s Application of Silva-Trevino Changes the CIMT
Analysis
In Bobadilla, the Eighth Circuit remanded the case because the
immigration judge and the BIA failed to apply the Silva-Trevino
framework.82 Through its application of the Silva-Trevino framework in
Bobadilla, the Eighth Circuit moved away from the common case test and
accepted the realistic probability test.83 The Eighth Circuit held that there
was a realistic probability that the statute would be applied to both morally
and non-morally turpitudinous conduct because Bobadilla was convicted
under a statute that did not include an intent element.84 As a result, an
immigration judge must now take additional steps to determine whether there
is a realistic probability that courts would apply a particular statute to crimes
that both do and do not involve moral turpitude.85 Therefore, immigration
attorneys should be familiar with the realistic probability test in order to best
serve their clients.
Additionally, the Eighth Circuit held that the immigration judge and
the BIA erred when they failed to consider any conviction documents to
determine whether Bobadilla’s conviction constituted a CIMT.86 As a result,
it is necessary to consider the context in which the crime occurred in order to
correctly determine whether Bobadilla’s conviction actually constituted a
CIMT under Minnesota law.87 The Eighth Circuit endorsed a broader use of

81
See supra note 4 and accompanying text (describing CIMTs as crimes
involving willful or intentional conduct and noting that recklessness may suffice in some cases
to include moral turpitude).
82
See supra text accompanying note 64 (stating that the BIA depended on prior
decisions that did not analyze MINN. STAT. § 609.506, subd.1, instead of applying the SilvaTrevino framework). Judge Gruender argued in his dissent that the BIA rightfully determined
that providing a false name to a peace officer constitutes a CIMT. See supra note 66 and
accompanying text (arguing that the court should have deferred to the BIA’s determination of
Bobadilla’s status).
83
See supra text accompanying note 29 (explaining the realistic probability test).
84
See supra text accompanying note 4 (describing what types of crimes generally
involve “morally turpitudinous” conduct”); see also supra text accompanying note 76
(discussing the Eighth Circuit’s application of the realistic probability test to Bobadilla’s
conviction for providing a false name to a peace officer).
85
See supra text accompanying note 76 (discussing the Eighth Circuit’s
reasoning that the Minnesota statute could apply to non-turpitudinous convictions).
86
See supra text accompanying notes 62–64 (discussing the holdings of the
immigration judge and the BIA).
87
See supra text accompanying note 79 (detailing the Eighth Circuit’s remand to
the BIA in Bobadilla).

Published by DigitalCommons@Hamline, 2014

19

Hamline Law Review, Vol. 37 [2014], Iss. 2, Art. 7

446

HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:427

the record of conviction, a position rejected by the majority of federal circuit
courts.88
If the broader use of the record of conviction fails to resolve the
inquiry, step three of the Silva-Trevino framework allows the adjudicator to
consider any additional evidence deemed necessary or appropriate to
accurately resolve the moral turpitude question.89 This is the most dramatic
change facing practitioners because the BIA and federal courts have
traditionally refused to consider evidence outside of the record of
conviction.90 The Eighth Circuit rationalized the court’s decision to allow
this practice by noting that there is an important distinction between the
individual who mistakenly gives a false name during a traffic stop and the
individual who fraudulently does so in an attempt to benefit from obstructing
the legal process.91 This distinction is important because it is part of the very
reason Congress adopted the CIMT terminology: to exclude or deport those
who would flagrantly break state and federal law.92 Aliens convicted of theft
or drug trafficking are two of the most common examples of CIMTs.93
The ability to look beyond the record of conviction has major
consequences for aliens fighting deportation. Prior to Silva-Trevino, if the
second step (the modified categorical approach) failed to resolve the inquiry,
the immigration judge was instructed to dismiss the case, essentially ruling
that the DOJ failed to meet their burden of proving that the conviction
constituted a CIMT.94 The narrow modified categorical approach rarely
resolves the conviction analysis because it only allows the adjudicator to
determine under which subdivision of the divisible statute the alien was
convicted.95 However, the broader approach advocated by Silva-Trevino
allows the adjudicator to examine the complete record of conviction, which
88
See supra text accompany notes 39–40 (discussing the majority and minority
views on applying the modified categorical approach). The majority (narrow) approach simply
looks to the record of conviction to determine what statutory subsection the conviction was
for, while the minority (broad) approach allows adjudicators to use other documents in the
record to assess the conduct underlying the alien’s conviction. Id.
89
See supra text accompanying note 54 (describing the third step of the SilvaTrevino framework).
90
See supra text accompanying note 55 (exploring various circuit court decisions
rejecting the Silva-Trevino framework and viewing the third step as inconsistent and an
impermissible reading of the INA section).
91
See supra text accompanying note 78 (noting that a person in Bobadilla’s
position of being pulled over by a police officer may not always be completely forthcoming
with police officers).
92
See supra text accompanying note 15 (explaining Congress’s rationale for
establishing the CIMT provision in the INA).
93
See supra note 4 and accompanying text (describing the type of crimes that
typically constitute CIMTs).
94
See supra text accompanying note 37 (stating that, prior to Silva-Trevino, the
conviction analysis ended at the end of the modified categorical approach if the record of
conviction failed to solve the inquiry).
95
See supra text accompanying note 39 (explaining the narrow modified
categorical approach applied by the majority of federal circuit courts).
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may include information that hurts the alien’s case.96 The Silva-Trevino
framework essentially gives the DOJ another opportunity to prove that the
conviction was for a CIMT, should the adjudicator choose to look beyond the
record. This prospect could be especially damaging for aliens who might
have negative witness statements or police reports regarding the alien’s
intent at the time of the crime. Immigration attorneys must therefore know
the circumstances surrounding their client’s conviction for a CIMT, even if
that evidence is not contained within the record of conviction. In order to
assist immigration attorneys, however, the criminal defense attorneys
defending the clients prior to removal proceedings should have an
understanding of potential immigration consequences their clients face.
B. Defending Aliens in Court: What Criminal Defense Attorneys Need to
Know
The Eighth Circuit’s application of the Silva-Trevino framework has
repercussions for criminal defense attorneys with alien clients. These
attorneys must understand the immigration consequences these clients face if
convicted of any crime because criminal convictions are very likely to
impact an alien’s immigration status.97 A criminal conviction could
potentially lead to the alien’s removal from the United States. Therefore, it is
essential for defense attorneys representing legal immigrants to have a basic
understanding of the process of determining CIMTs.
Based on the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Bobadilla, criminal defense
attorneys will need to be especially aware of the consequences a
misdemeanor conviction for providing a false name to a peace officer will
have for an alien client.98 An immigration judge is permitted to look beyond
the record of conviction in order to determine whether the alien client’s
conviction constitutes a CIMT.99 This is a shift in the Eighth Circuit’s past
position, which did not allow immigration judges to look beyond the record
96
See supra text accompanying note 40 (noting various courts’ broadened use of
the record of conviction to determine whether an alien’s conviction constituted a CIMT). For
instance, the broader approach would allow an adjudicator to use an alien’s confession of
providing a false name for fraudulent reasons during his plea testimony, while the narrow
approach limits the adjudicator’s use of the record of conviction to the statute. Therefore,
under the broader approach, the adjudicator would find that the alien’s conviction constituted
a CIMT, while the analysis would remain unresolved under the narrow approach because the
statute does not specify fraudulent conduct. Because the narrow-approach jurisdictions
continue to reject the Silva-Trevino framework, the conviction analysis would likely end here
and the alien would not be removed (deported) from the United States.
97
See supra note 16 and accompanying text (describing some of the
consequences facing aliens convicted of CIMTs).
98
See supra note 63 and accompanying text (noting that the two gross
misdemeanor subdivisions of MINN. STAT. § 609.605 involve fraudulent conduct and therefore
constitute CIMTs).
99
See supra note 54 and accompanying text (exploring the type of documents
that can be included in a “beyond the record” analysis).
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of conviction.100 The largely fact-specific analysis that immigration judges
will undertake to determine whether the alien’s conviction under the statute
constitutes a CIMT could essentially lead to a sort of “retrial.” This “retrial”
allows immigration judges to examine any material he or she deems
necessary to resolve the conviction analysis, including witness statements,
police reports, and the alien’s own confessions.101 Therefore, the alien will
not only be subject to criminal punishment for his or her actions, but may
also be permanently removed from the United States.102
Bobadilla’s application of the Silva-Trevino framework may also be
used in the analysis of other divisible crimes. As of this writing, the
Bobadilla decision has already been cited by a federal district court applying
the Silva-Trevino framework to a domestic assault conviction.103 Thus,
Eighth Circuit courts appear to be increasingly likely to consider contextbased evidence to determine moral turpitude.104 Whether Bobadilla’s
adoption of the Silva-Trevino framework is a legal aberration that will be
ignored or overruled in the future, or whether it will remain the law of the
land, remains to be seen.
Based on the foregoing, criminal defense attorneys should urge their
alien clients to plead to an offense that cannot constitute a CIMT under any
step of the categorical approach.105 Alternatively, criminal defense attorneys
should seek a reduced plea to any other offense that would not be considered
reprehensible or even to include reprehensible conduct based on the elements
of the statutes.106 The offense selected should only have one set of elements
and should not be divisible.107 Pleading to a non-divisible statute would
allow immigration attorneys to later argue that there is no ambiguity in the

100

See supra note 70 and accompanying text (providing that Guardado-Garcia
rejected the Silva-Trevino approach, including the third step, as inconsistent with the Eighth
Circuit’s precedent).
101
See supra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing the types of extra-record
evidence circuit courts opposing the Silva-Trevino framework were concerned would be
considered by immigration judges).
102
See supra note 16 and accompanying text (explaining several important
immigration consequences for a CIMT conviction, including permanent removal from the
United States).
103
Ghanim v. Napolitano, No. 4:12CV1818SNLJ, 2013 WL 4401837 (E.D. Mo.
2013) (applying the Silva-Trevino framework to a domestic assault conviction).
104
See supra note 77 and accompanying text (noting an Eighth Circuit court’s use
of an aliens prior convictions to note that his conduct did not “comport with that of the
average citizen” in his community).
105
See supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text (discussing the types of criminal
acts normally considered CIMTs).
106
See supra text accompanying note 75 (discussing the BIA’s rationale that
Bobadilla’s act of providing a false name to a peace officer “reflect[ed] an intentional attempt
to evade responsibility, [and therefore] the conduct covered by the statute is inherently base,
vile, and reprehensible . . . .”).
107
See supra note 47 and accompanying text (defining when a statute is divisible).
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statute, barring the alien’s conviction from being labeled a CIMT.108 The
conviction would not meet the standard of the traditional categorical
approach because the conviction would specify a lower level of scienter than
“specific intent, deliberateness, willfulness, or recklessness.”109 Therefore,
the CIMT analysis would end, the alien would not be deported, and there
would be no reason to move on to step two of the analysis.
C. In Practice: Ray’s Story
Ray, the LPR from the introduction, faces deportation due to his
recent conviction for providing a false name to a peace officer.110 Ray’s first
mistake was failing to retain a criminal defense attorney to help guide him
through the criminal process. Ray had a conviction for theft, a CIMT, on his
record from a few years ago.111 Ray’s criminal defense attorney would be
aware that Ray may face removal if he pleads guilty to providing a false
name to a peace officer. Ray’s attorney could then work with the prosecutor
to plead his charges down to misdemeanor charges for failing to provide
proof of insurance and speeding.112 Therefore, Ray’s immigration status
would not be affected by the failure to provide proof of insurance charge
because that misdemeanor is not considered a CIMT.
Without the assistance of a criminal attorney, Ray pleaded guilty and
now faces the removal process. Suppose Ray retained an immigration
attorney to help him avoid deportation. The immigration attorney read the
Bobadilla decision, which held that providing a false name to a peace officer
was not a CIMT under the realistic probability test of the traditional
categorical approach.113 Therefore, the immigration attorney should argue
that there is a strong likelihood under the Bobadilla decision and other state
law cases that the providing a false name to a peace officer statute would be
considered non-morally turpitudinous conduct.

108
See supra note 25 and accompanying text (noting that a conviction under a
statute that is divisible into several subsections may result in only some convictions that
involve moral turpitude).
109
See supra note 53 and accompanying text (stating that the record of conviction
may demonstrate that the conviction was for conduct that reflected “specific intent,
deliberateness, willfulness, or recklessness”).
110
See supra Part I (introducing and explaining the hypothetical Ray’s situation).
111
See supra note 59 and accompanying text (stating that theft is automatically
considered a CIMT).
112
See supra note 2 and accompanying text (noting that failing to provide proof of
insurance to a peace officer is not considered a CIMT because it does not involve inherently
base, vile, or turpitudinous conduct).
113
See supra text accompanying notes 75–76 (discussing the Eighth Circuit’s
rationale for finding that there was a realistic probability that providing a false name to a
peace officer may not constitute a CIMT).
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Ray’s attorney should then proceed to step two, the modified
categorical approach.114 The modified categorical approach allows the
immigration judge to look to Ray’s record of conviction to determine
whether his conviction constituted a CIMT.115 Immigration attorneys are
likely familiar with the narrow modified categorical approach used by the
Eighth Circuit prior to Bobadilla. The narrow modified categorical approach
only allowed adjudicators to look at the record of conviction in order to
determine under what subdivision of the divisible statute the alien was
convicted.116 In Ray’s situation, the immigration judge applying the narrow
modified categorical approach would only have discovered that Ray was
convicted under the first subdivision of the statute.117 The first subdivision of
the statute would not be helpful to the immigration judge, who would then
likely find that the categorical analysis results were inconclusive and end the
removal process.118 The end of the removal process allows Ray to remain in
the country.
Ray is not as fortunate after Bobadilla’s adoption of the SilvaTrevino framework. The Silva-Trevino framework adopted an expansive
view of the record of conviction, enabling adjudicators to examine the
complete record of conviction to determine whether an alien’s conviction
constituted a CIMT.119 Therefore, Ray’s immigration judge will be able to
use the charging document citing Officer Jones’ report to prove that Ray
committed a CIMT.120 In this case, Ray will likely be deported, unless there
is other evidence in his record of conviction to refute this statement.121 Thus,
in Ray’s case, the results from the broad categorical approach would be the
exact opposite of the narrow categorical approach. This is one of the main
reasons immigration attorneys need to be familiar with their clients’
complete records of conviction.
114
See supra text accompanying notes 31–40 (describing the two primary forms of
the modified categorical approach).
115
See supra text accompanying notes 33–38 (exploring the modified categorical
approach).
116
See supra text accompanying note 39 (explaining the narrow modified
categorical approach).
117
See supra note 60 and accompanying text (setting out the language of MINN.
STAT. § 609.506).
118
See supra text accompanying note 38 (noting that, prior to Silva-Trevino, the
conviction analysis ended if the modified categorical approach failed to establish that the
criminal conviction constituted a CIMT).
119
See supra text accompanying note 40 (describing the minority view permitting
a broader use of the record of conviction to determine whether a crime constitutes a CIMT).
120
See supra text accompanying note 34 (explaining what documents are
considered part of the record of conviction under the Silva-Trevino framework).
121
See supra text accompanying note 34 (explaining evidence could include Ray’s
written plea agreement, his plea testimony, and/or the criminal judge’s statements when
accepting Ray’s plea). These documents would need to indicate that Ray’s conduct did not
involve fraudulent intent (i.e., Ray was not lying in order to avoid a criminal charge for failing
to have proof of insurance).
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Presume that there is evidence in Ray’s record of conviction
suggesting that he provided a false name out of fear, rather than in order to
avoid criminal liability for not having insurance. Ray’s immigration attorney
should then be prepared for step three.122 Under Silva-Trevino, Ray’s
immigration judge is allowed to consider any evidence outside of the record
of conviction deemed necessary to resolve the conviction analysis.123
Evidence outside of the record may include Officer Jones’ police report,
prosecutor remarks, and any statement Ray made outside of the judgment
and sentence.124 These documents have the potential to help or hurt Ray’s
case depending on their contents.
Ray’s unfortunate story illustrates the importance for immigration
attorneys to be aware of all of the documents related to their client’s criminal
conviction. Documents that would have previously been inadmissible in an
immigration proceeding can now be used against an alien. Immigration
attorneys should try to mitigate harmful statements and documents in order
to prevent their clients’ deportation.
V. CONCLUSION
Bobadilla has important implications for attorneys in the Eighth
Circuit. The court’s adoption of the controversial Silva-Trevino framework
increases the obstacles aliens face in proving that their convictions are not
CIMTs. Criminal defense attorneys must be familiar with these changes in
CIMT analysis in order to help alien clients avoid potential immigration
consequences. Immigration attorneys need to adjust to arguing the realistic
probability test under the traditional categorical approach. Immigration
attorneys must also be aware of the broadened use of the record of conviction
and the potential use of documents outside of the record, in order to best
represent clients.

122

See supra text accompany note 54 (exploring the third step of the Silva-Trevino

framework).

123

See supra text accompanying note 53 (noting the Silva-Trevino framework
permits a broader use of the record of conviction under the modified categorical approach).
124
See supra note 54 and accompanying text (providing a full list of extra-record
evidence an adjudicator may consider to resolve the conviction analysis).
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